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According to the statistics, the Dutch capital Amsterdam was becoming ever more secular 
during the interwar years (1918-1940). This article, however, argues that religion in 
Amsterdam continued to have a big impact on urban government and society. During the 
interwar years social and political debates about modernisation, and the emergence of mass 
entertainment in particular, were strongly influenced by religious ideas, norms and values: 
Amsterdam’s public sphere was still charged with religion.  
 
For long, our understanding of the role of religion in the ‘modern city’ has been 
obscured by the equation of urbanisation with secularisation.1 A strong narrative of 
urban religious decline has hidden from view the way in which religion has been 
(re)shaped and (re)framed within the modern city.2 This misconception follows from 
the equation of the meta-narrative of modernisation with secularisation.3 According to 
this line of thought modernisation, defined as rapid, fundamental changes like 
industrialisation and urbanisation which uprooted social relations, caused religious 
decline. From the late nineteenth century onwards the Western world is said to have 
become more secular: less people went to church and the number of non-believers 
grew. In particular the urban areas of Europe were said to have experienced a 
religious crisis, caused by the disruption of traditional social relations. This orthodox 
interpretation has been criticised by revisionists who have argued that nineteenth 
century cities were ‘the most dynamic centres of religious activism’ which was aimed 
at countering the secular trend.4 A third line of interpretation, as argued by Hugh 
McLeod, has moved away from the dominant discourse of religious growth and 
decline and instead focuses on religious conflict as a means to explain ‘the change 
from the relatively homogeneous religious cultures which characterised the 
eighteenth-century city, to the polarised religious world of the nineteenth-century city, 
to the relatively fragmented religious structure of cities in the later twentieth 
century’.5  
Both the – implicit – notion of succeeding stages or regimes and the process of 
polarisation are also to be found in the work of the historian of Dutch religion Peter 
van Rooden. In his seminal study Religieuze regimes, Van Rooden questions the 
dominant orthodox interpretation of Dutch religious history and argues that the history 
of Dutch Christianity can instead be best understood by discriminating between 
different ‘regimes’ of Christendom which have succeeded each other.6 One of the 
                                                
1 The author would like to thank Paul van Trigt and Matthijs Wieldraaijer for their comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
2 Robert A. Orsi ed., Gods of the city. Religion and the American urban landscape (Bloomington, 
1999) ix, 42; Hugh McLeod ed., European religion in the age of great cities, 1830-1930 (London and 
New York, 1995) 9-10. 
3 For a short international overview of the literature on secularisation and modernisation see: Benjamin 
Ziemann, ‘Säkularisierung, Konfessionalisierung, Organisationsbildung. Dimensionen der 
Sozialgeschichte der Religion im langen 19. Jahrhundert’, Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 47 (2007) 485-
508, there 491-492. 
4 McLeod, European religion, 8. 
5 Ibid., 23-24. 
6 Peter van Rooden, Religieuze regimes. Over godsdienst en maatschappij in Nederland 1570-1990 
(Amsterdam 1996); Ibid., ‘Long-term religious developments in the Netherlands, c. 1750-2000’, Hugh 
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regime changes occurred in the last quarter of the nineteenth century when the 
Protestant Nation, a religious regime dominated by liberal-protestant and elitist views 
on state and society, was substituted for the pillarised society. In the case of the 
Netherlands pillarisation refers to the division of society into four different segments: 
a Protestant, Catholic, social democratic and liberal or neutral pillar, each with their 
own network of organisations and associations, which encompassed almost every 
field of social, political and cultural life. Despite the collapse of the religious ‘unity’ 
of the Protestant Nation and the emergence of two secular pillars, within Dutch 
pillarised society religious identities were ever present. As Van Rooden has argued 
‘religious difference came to lie at the heart of personal identity and social 
organization’.7 Moreover, thanks to the wide-ranging networks of pillarised 
organisations, which included almost all layers of society, religious norms and values 
could be transported to all layers of society and into the farthest corners of the 
country. The pillars in fact acted as ‘modernizing forces’ in many ways: they 
integrated their adherents into larger (imagined) communities and used modern 
communication techniques like mass open air meetings and the radio to inform and 
discipline them.8 In the case of Dutch nineteenth and early twentieth century religious 
history, therefore, the equation of modernisation with secularisation, defined as ‘the 
process whereby religious thinking, practice and institutions lose social significance’, 
does not hold true.9 
Nonetheless, in Dutch society, and particularly in the big cities, from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century onwards, the fear for religious decline and the 
modernisation of society were highly-debated issues among church leaders, 
‘sociologists’ and representatives of pillarised organisations. In general, 
modernisation in this case referred to a broad range of developments which were said 
to affect the foundations of state and society, like the emergence of mass movements, 
the evolution of mass media, technological innovations, industrialisation and 
urbanisation. In the Netherlands, like anywhere else in the Western world, 
modernisation was also associated with fears for moral degeneration. As Robert Orsi 
has shown for the American case, religious organisations came up with different 
solutions in order to contain the dangers of the city, like Sunday schools, revival 
rhetoric and pastoralisation campaigns.10 In the Netherlands, too, socio-religious 
organisations were well aware of the impact of ‘modernity’. A whole range of social 
issues appeared on their agendas in order to meet the challenges posed by 
modernisation: social welfare, housing, hygiene and morality, to name but a few.11  
At first, up until the end of the nineteenth century, most of these – 
predominantly liberal-protestant and elitist – organisations in the Netherlands were 
based on rather patronising views on the moral backwardness of ordinary citizens. 
According to them, trying to impose the bourgeois’ moral framework on the working 
                                                                                                                                       
McLeod and Werner Ustorf eds., The Decline of Christendom in Western Europe, 1750-2000 
(Cambridge, 2003) 113-129, there 113; Peter van Rooden, ‘Secularization, dechristianization and 
rechristianization in the Netherlands’ in: Hartmut Lehmann ed., Säkularisierung, Dechristianisierung, 
Rechristianisierung im neuzeitlichen Europa (Göttingen, 1997) 131-153. 
7 Van Rooden, ‘Secularization in the Netherlands’, Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 11 (1998) 34-41, there 38.  
8 Ibid., 37. 
9 Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in secular society (Harmondsworth, 1966) 14. 
10 Orsi, Gods of the city, 19; see also: Neil M. Maher, Nature’s New Deal. The Civilian Conservation 
Corps and the Roots of the American Environmental Movement (New York, 2008) 31-32 and McLeod, 
European religion, 8. 
11 Dirk Jan Wolffram, Vrĳ van wat neerdrukt en beklemt. Staat, gemeenschap en sociale politiek (1870-
1918) (Amsterdam, 2003). 
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class would be attempting the impossible, whereas the government could only try to 
suppress existing moral excesses by law.12 In the last quarter of the century these 
liberal-protestant organisations, however, were gradually replaced by a more diverse 
set of organisations linked to the four pillars in Dutch society.13 As recent research has 
shown, pillarised organisations tried to adapt to and control the force of 
modernisation;14 they were engaged in setting up relief works and provided for ‘moral 
stewardship’ in times of rapid urban change. The erstwhile dominant repressive 
approach was now accompanied by more constructivist views on enhancing public 
morals. Members of one of the several anti-prostitution leagues which were 
established in the 1880s and 90s for instance posted in the vicinity of brothels trying 
to talk potential visitors out of entering.15 The emergence of such new religious relief 
organisations enhanced the cities’ religious infrastructure and enforced the 
involvement of churches in urban life.16 At the turn of the century the Netherlands, 
therefore, did not witness a process of secularization. On the contrary: religion was 
ever present. Despite fears for an ever-growing apostasy, a decline in church 
attendance and the emergence of a secular labour movement, in the early twentieth 
century religion continued to exert influence on Dutch society. This article will 
demonstrate this by focusing on the public and political debate about the emergence 
of a modern, mass entertainment culture. 
Despite the existence of different and distinct pillars, each with their own 
views on politics, religion and society, this article will show that in the early decades 
of the twentieth century the discourse on the deterioration of morals was dominated 
by Christian-based norms and values, like it had been in the nineteenth century 
Protestant Nation, albeit that those norms and values were now up for debate.17 
Despite concerns about secularisation, religion – and Christendom more in particular 
– was still a fundamental characteristic of Dutch society, also and – as this article will 
show – particularly in the big city, where socio-religious organisations, political 
parties and policy makers were very much engaged in the moral quality of modern 
urban life. This article sets out to explain and exemplify this engagement on the basis 
of a case study of Amsterdam during the interwar years which focuses on the 
reception of specific elements of modern culture that aroused fears for moral 
degeneration, like the emergence of a new entertainment culture around dance halls, 
movie theatres and jazz clubs. It will be demonstrated that the public and political 
debate on modernity in Amsterdam was dominated by religious ideas, norms and 
values. By focusing on debates this article follows McLeod’s earlier-mentioned ‘third 
                                                
12 Henk te Velde, Gemeenschapszin en plichtsbesef. Liberalisme en nationalisme in Nederland, 1870-
1918 (Groningen, 1992) 212-215; Peter van Rooden, 'Oral history en het vreemde sterven van het 
Nederlandse christendom', BMGN / Low Countries Historical Review 119 (2004) 524-551, there 546-
547. 
13 Rooden, Religieuze regimes, 147-199. 
14 Madelon de Keizer, ‘Inleiding’ in: Madelon de Keizer and Ismee Tames eds., Moderniteit. 
Modernisme en massacultuur in Nederland, 1914-1940. Jaarboek van het Nederlands Instituut voor 
Oorlogsdocumentatie 15 (Zutphen, 2004) 9-44, there, 34-39; see also: Erik Sengers, ‘“Because we are 
Catholic, we are modern”. The adaptation of Dutch Catholicism to modern Dutch society 1920-1960’, 
Bijdragen. International Journal in Philosophy and Theology 67 (2006) 23-41. 
15 J.N. van Munster, Met zegen bekroond: grepen uit de geschiedenis van veertig jaren der 
Nederlandsche Middernacht-Zending-Vereeniging (Amsterdam, 1929).  
16 Orsi, Gods of the city, 24-25. 
17 Van Rooden, 'Oral history', 535-536; S. Stuurman, Verzuiling, kapitalisme en patriarchaat. Aspecten 
van de ontwikkeling van de moderne staat in Nederland (Nijmegen, 1983) 222-224, 233-234; Pieter 
Koenders, Tussen christelijk réveil en seksuele revolutie. Bestrijding van zedeloosheid in Nederland, 
met nadruk op de repressie van homoseksualiteit (Amsterdam, 1996) 137, 140-143;  
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way of looking at the religious development of European cities in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century’.18 
For two reasons, this contribution explicitly takes into account the political 
perspective. First, in Amsterdam politics had a lot to do with religion: the city was 
governed by an Orthodox-Protestant mayor and about one third of the city councillors 
belonged to one of the Christian political parties. Second, the emergence of a modern 
entertainment culture was an explicitly political issue, since it affected existing views 
on and regulations regarding the public order and norms and values in society. The 
first section of this article deals with religious life in Amsterdam in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. Amsterdam’s political life will be presented in section two. 
Section three discusses the public debate on modern culture. Finally, section four 
builds on the previous ones to draw some conclusions on the role of religion in early 




Since the last decade, religion has re-emerged as a dominant social and political issue 
in Amsterdam and the Netherlands as a whole. Right now, the Islamic community is 
the largest religious denomination in Amsterdam. As shown in table 1, when asked 
what religion they felt affinity for, in 2007 twelve percent of the Amsterdam 
population mentioned the Islam, followed by Roman Catholicism with nine percent.19 
The influence and presence of the Islam in Amsterdam has put under pressure one of 
the most important self-ascribed virtues of the city: Amsterdam’s tolerance towards 
people with a ‘different’ ethnic or religious background. Debates centre on the role of 
the Islam in public life: the construction of mosques, civil servants who wear head 
scarves, male representatives of Islamic organisations who refuse to shake hands with 
women, the high intolerance of homosexuality among Islamic youth and so on.20  
The current struggle with the Islam in Amsterdam has to be seen against the 
background of the marginalisation of religion as a socio-political issue after the 1960s. 
In many aspects, this decade marked a radical shift in Amsterdam history. On the 
political scene the old elites disappeared or marginalised and were replaced by a new, 
young generation of progressive politicians. On the social level, Amsterdam started to 
build on its reputation as the libertine and hedonist capital of Europe.21 Moreover, 
Amsterdam turned out to be the centre of most of the protest movements that emerged 
in the Netherlands in the 1960s and 70s: the feminist movement, different youth 
movements and the squatter movement.22 According to Van Rooden the Dutch 
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, which first emerged in Amsterdam, marked a 
‘regime shift’: the ‘highly patriarchal and ascetic’ Orthodox Protestant and Roman 
Catholic religious movements dissolved when their politics of ‘strict morals, 
                                                
18 McLeod, European religion, 23. 
19 De Amsterdamse burgermonitor 2007. Municipality of Amsterdam, Bureau of Research and 
Statistics. See: http://www.os.amsterdam.nl/pdf/2007_burgermonitor_verwantschap_religie.pdf. 
20 See for instance: Marcel Maussen, Ruimte voor de islam? Stedelĳk beleid, voorzieningen, 
organisaties (Apeldoorn, 2006). 
21 J.C. Kennedy, Building new Babylon, Cultural change in the Netherlands during the 1960s (Ann 
Arbor, 1995), translated in Dutch: Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw. Nederland in de jaren zestig 
(Amsterdam, 1995). 
22 P. de Rooy ed., Geschiedenis van Amsterdam IV, Tweestrijd om de hoofdstad, 1900-2000  
(Amsterdam, 2007) passim. 
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traditional gender roles and patriarchal forms of authority’ were undermined.23 As 
will be shown in section three, up until the 1960s their strict morals had been at the 
basis of the Dutch legal moral framework.  
Whereas the secularisation of the Dutch moral framework took effect after the 
Cultural Revolution, other secular trends had already been in progress. In the early 
twentieth century Orthodox Protestants in Amsterdam discussed efforts to raise 
church attendance.24 Moreover, the ten-yearly censuses showed an ever growing 
number of people who reported not to belong to one of the religious denominations. 
Table 2 shows that in 1920 slightly more than 21% of the people of Amsterdam did 
not belong to a church. This percentage had almost doubled in eleven years time, 
predominantly at the cost of the Dutch Reformed Church, which, however, remained 
the largest denomination in Amsterdam with almost 30% of the population as a 
registered member.25 The Catholics came in second followed by the Sephardic and 
Ashkenazim Israelites. The decline in church membership was rather evenly spread 
across the city, albeit that the working class districts harbored the highest percentage 
of apostates.26 These percentages, however, might lead to a distorted picture. First of 
all, the Roman Catholics managed to cover up the apostasy by an ever continuing 
flow of demographical growth.27 Second, membership of a denomination sheds no 
light on individual religious belief or the social significance of religion in general.28 
Finally, the lack of decent statistical information for the nineteenth century makes it 
hard to draw conclusions on religious developments like church attendance or 
membership over time.  
In any case, during the interwar years religion still profoundly influenced 
public and political life in Amsterdam in several ways. In the 1920s religion was 
brought into public space more and more: on the streets, in marketplaces, parks and 
public gardens, where soapbox preachers held their sermons and religious brochures 
and pamphlets were dispersed and sold. The Catholics in particular, lost their fear of 
publicly expressing their religious beliefs. For long, Catholics in the Netherlands had 
been looked upon as second-class citizens, because they deviated from the Protestant 
norm. In the first half of the nineteenth century, when the Netherlands entered a 
gradual process of nation building, in spite of the separation of church and state Dutch 
identity had been based on Protestant norms and values.29 In the second half of the 
century, Catholic self-confidence went up, boosted by the reintroduction of the 
Episcopal hierarchy in 1853. Towards the end of the century, with the birth of 
pillarisation, the Protestant Nation was progressively dismantled. In 1888 a coalition 
government of Orthodox Protestants and Catholics took office. It marked the 
existence of a new divide in Dutch politics and society: between believers and 
                                                
23 Van Rooden, ‘Long-term religious developments’, 123; cf. Callum G. Brown, The Death of 
Christian Britain. Understanding secularization 1800-2000 (London and New York, 2003) passim. 
24 Wouter P. Beekers and Rolf E. van der Woude, Niet bij steen alleen. Patrimonium Amsterdam: van 
sociale vereniging tot sociale onderneming 1876-2003 (Hilversum, 2008) 91; see also Jakob Pieter 
Kruijt, De onkerkelijkheid in Nederland, haar verbreiding en oorzaken. Proeve eener sociografische 
verklaring (Groningen, s.a.) 51-52. 
25 De resultaten der volks- en beroepstelling van 31 december 1920 voor Amsterdam zonder en met het 
op 1 januari 1921 geannexeerde gebied. Deel 1. De volkstelling. (Amsterdam, 1924) 26-27; R.L. 
Schuursma, Jaren van opgang. Nederland 1900-1930 (Amsterdam, 2000) 121. 
26 Kruijt, De onkerkelijkheid, 266 (table). 
27 W.H. Vermooten, Hervormd Amsterdam en zijn maatschappelijke achtergrond in de 19e en 20e 
eeuw (The Hague, 1960) 51-53. 
28 Steve Bruce, God is dead. Secularization in the West (Oxford 2002).   
29 Van Rooden, ‘Long-term religious developments’, 116. 
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unbelievers, better known as the Antithesis. The emancipation of Dutch Catholics as 
true patriots, however, turned out to be a long-winded process. It took until 1918 
before the Catholic political party, since long the biggest confessional party in the 
Netherlands, were confident enough to claim the prime ministership. In Amsterdam, 
only after the turn of the century the Catholics dared to take to the streets. The annual 
procession to commemorate the ‘Miracle of Amsterdam’ eventually drew an ever 
growing number of participants: some sixty thousand people at the end of the 1930s.  
In 1924 thousands of Catholics assembled in Amsterdam for the International 
Eucharistic Conference.30 A final example of Catholic self confidence was the 
missionary zeal of the Catholic Evidence Guild which emerged on the streets of the 
city in the 1920s. According to the Guild many members of the working class might 
be fed up with the church, but had not yet totally lost their faith. They were still to be 
saved, albeit that the church had to find new ways to do so, rather than the traditional, 
dogmatic and intellectual approach. The Guild for instance used street preachers from 
a humble background who spoke the language of the working class.31 The Guild was 
one of the many new religious organisations which were founded during the interwar 
years and were aimed at making converts or at least tried to keep the flock together 
with the use of street preachers, by canvassing with brochures, or through the 
organisation of social activities.32 
Furthermore, the public appearance of religion was enforced through the 
enhancement of the religious infrastructure of the city. Thanks to the (joined) efforts 
of local government, housing corporations and private building companies house-
building boomed in the 1920s. Amsterdam expanded in all directions. The city’s new 
residential areas would turn out to be rather religiously and politically segregated. 
Roman Catholic, Orthodox-Protestant, social democratic and neutral housing 
corporations each built their own housing blocks which formed a community in 
itself.33 The blocks often incorporated a club building designated for activities related 
to the pillar in question: a meeting place for the Catholic billiard club, a conference 
room for the Catholic labour union and so on. Eventually some of the new districts 
clearly bore the stamp of their dominant political or religious denomination, like 
communist Amsterdam North-Side, the Orthodox-Protestant Hugo de Groot-district 
and the ‘red and jewish’ Transvaal-district.34 The suburbanisation of the city was 
paralleled by a boom in church building in the new neighbourhoods, while at the same 
time churches in the old city centre, which slowly depopulated, had to close their 
doors. Within a couple of years the Dutch Reformed Church opened three new 
churches across the city and closed down the old Zuiderkerk.35 
                                                
30 De Rooy, Geschiedenis van Amsterdam IV, 61-62 and 136-137. 
31 Jos. Mineur, 'De steen door de ruit', Roeping 5 (1926-1927) 429-430, there 429; Erna Treurniet, 
'Diaconie in crisistijd' in: C. Augustijn ed., Gereformeerd Amsterdam sedert 1835 (Kampen, 1989) 
100-107, there 106. 
32 Ada G. Endeveld and Wies J. Houweling, 'Op Gereformeerden Grondslag. Jeugdverenigingen in de 
jaren twintig' in: Augustijn, Gereformeerd Amsterdam, 77-88, there 77, 82-85. 
33 Beekers and Van der Woude, Niet bij steen alleen. 
34 P-P. de Baar, ‘Linkse en rechtse buurten’, Ons Amsterdam 55 (2003) 84-89. 
35 H.C. Endedijk, De Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland I, 1892-1936 (Kampen, 1990) 228; S. 
Duparc, ‘Kroniek 1929’, Jaarboek Amstelodamum 27 (1930) 332, 337; Guido Hoogewoud, ‘De 
geschakeerde stad. De infrastructuur van het geloofsleven’ in: Martha Bakker e.d, Amsterdam in de 
Tweede Gouden Eeuw (Bussum, 2000) 209-236; Guido Hoogewoud, 'Kerkbouw als sociaal-
cultuurpolitiek fenomeen. Religieuze bouwactiviteiten in Amsterdam tussen 1945 en 1993' in: J.D. Snel 
et al. ed., En God bleef toch in Mokum. Amsterdamse kerkgeschiedenis in de negentiende en twintigste 
eeuw (Delft, 2000) 519-553, aldaar 521-522. 
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Finally, religion even made it to the newspapers headlines. In 1926 a ‘modern’ 
interpretation of Gen. 3 – the speaking serpent – led to the expulsion of the Orthodox-
Protestant minister J.G. Geelkerken who was based in the Amsterdam Park Church. 
Geelkerken was supported by his church council, but the synod of the Reformed 
Churches in the Netherlands did not tolerate his behavior. Geelkerken’s expulsion 
caused a schism within the Reformed Churches. The first sermons of Geelkerken after 
his expulsion were closely watched by the police, who guarded the entrance of the 
Park Church to prevent public unrest.36 In essence, the expulsion of Geelkerken was 
caused by different views within the Reformed Churches on the relationship between 
modernisation and religion. Geelkerken has been typified as the representative of the 
‘youth’ within the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands: in this case ‘youth’ was 
directly linked with modern religious views.37 Geelkerken’s ‘modernist’ religious 
ideas indeed particularly appealed to (young) intellectuals of the post war 
generation.38 Apart from this intra-religious conflict, Amsterdam also witnessed 
clashes between different religious groups. In the 1920s the activities of the Catholic 
Evidence Guild caused public unrest. The members of the Guild were well-known for 
their rather provocative public sermons in which Protestants, socialists and 
communists were abused. On many occasions the police was forced to intervene when 
members of the Guild, who preached their sermons in parks and public gardens in the 
vicinity of working class neighborhoods, were besieged by angry opponents.39 The 
chief of police decided to ban the Guild from the public parks and gardens in 
Amsterdam. The religious bull fights, however, did not cease and the mayor therefore 
decided to ban all street preachers from the streets of Amsterdam for one year.40 All in 
all, where statistical information might lead us to the conclusion that religion 





On a political level Amsterdam had been a predominantly liberal city right from the 
introduction of local democracy in 1851. Up until the end of the First World War, 
Amsterdam was governed by liberal mayors. Moreover, liberal governors dominated 
the board of mayor and aldermen. Most of this liberal elite belonged to the 
predominantly moderate Dutch Reformed Church, which was, as shown in the first 
section, the most dominant religious denomination in Amsterdam up until the 1920s. 
Looking at the religious background of the councillors, throughout the nineteenth 
century the composition of the city council did not reflect the religious relations in 
Amsterdam; Catholics in particular were under- and Dutch Reformed 
                                                
36 Endedijk, De Gereformeerde Kerken, 196, 199. 
37 Ibid., 199; J. Peters and  O. Schreuder, Katholiek en protestant. Een historisch en contemporain 
onderzoek naar confessionele culturen (Nijmegen, 1987) 110. 
38 D.Th. Kuiper, 'Gefnuikte vernieuwing. De "beweging der jongeren" in de Gereformeerde Kerken in 
Nederland in de periode 1910-1930' in: J. de Bruijn, J.G.M. de Bruijn and G.J. Schutte eds., Tussen 
observatie en participatie. Twee eeuwen gereformeerde en antirevolutionaire wereld in 
ontwikkelingsperspectief. Verzamelde opstellen (Hilversum, 2002) 125-152, there 142; Ben van Kaam, 
Parade der mannenbroeders. Flitsen uit het protestantse leven in Nederland in de jaren 1918-1938 
(Wageningen, 1965) 96-97. 
39 B. Voets, 'De klare waarheid' in: Herman Pijfers ed., De klare waarheid en andere herinneringen aan 
het katholieke verleden (Nijmegen, 2001) 129-145, there 130-131; ACA, General Affairs Archive 
(5181), inv. nr. 4258, no. 3719. 
40 Voets, 'De klare waarheid', 133; ACA, 5181, inv. nr. 4258, no. 3719. 
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overrepresented. The situation, however, changed at the turn of the century, when the 
liberal political dominance came under pressure from the confessional political parties 
and the social democrats who managed to mobilise a large part of the ‘new 
electorate’: citizens who acquired the right to vote thanks to a lowering of the census. 
As shown in table 3, this development was reflected in the religious composition of 
the council. The loss of Dutch Reformed dominance went hand in hand with the rise 
of the number of Catholic and Jewish councillors; the latter predominantly belonged 
to either the social-democratic or the communist party. Moreover, the number of 
nonbelievers – councillors who stated not to belong to one of the religious 
deonominations – increased from 6.4 percent in 1899 to 24.4 percent of the city 
council members in 1914. This percentage would have been even higher when one 
takes into account the fact that many of the Jewish councillors felt no connection with 
the Jewish religion.41  
Meanwhile, however, the number of councillors belonging to a confessional 
political party reached an all time high. As shown in table 4, both the left-wing 
political parties and the confessional parties were the victors of the first post war 
elections in 1919. They gained most from recent changes in the Electoral Law, like 
the introduction of proportional representation (1917) and general suffrage (1919), 
which permanently ended the liberal dominance in Amsterdam. In a political sense, 
the ‘liberal city’ would be replaced by an interesting, and sometimes fiery mix of 
social-democratic, confessional and, to a lesser extent liberal politics and policies. 
Looking at the distribution of seats in the city council the confessional political 
influence even reached its peak in the 1920s with one third of the councillors 
belonging to one of three confessional political parties: the Orthodox Protestant ARP, 
the Roman Catholic Party and the predominantly Dutch-Reformed CHU. Despite their 
religious differences these parties cooperated pretty well; they for instance established 
their own club of confessional council members which met a couple of times per year. 
The confessional wing’s figure heads were councillor Carl Romme and mayor 
Willem de Vlugt. Romme was a Catholic lawyer who headed the Catholic party in the 
city council and emerged as the prime opponent of the social democratic governors of 
the city. He was a Neo-Thomist who criticised the existing liberal democratic order 
and urged for a Christian corporatist state. Romme tried to implement some of his 
corporatist ideas in Amsterdam, but almost without any effect.42 De Vlugt was an 
Orthodox Protestant former alderman who was appointed to the office of mayor by 
the Queen in 1921. Like Romme, De Vlugt had established himself in Amsterdam 
local politics as an opponent of social democratic municipal policy. Before his 
mayorship, former contractor De Vlugt had been responsible for the city’s Public 
Works Department.43 At first, De Vlugt’s religious background did not appear to exert 
much influence on his political and administrative outlook. His electoral campaigns 
lacked any religious undertone: De Vlugt presented himself as a self-made man and a 
champion of private enterprise.44 During his mayorship, however, the apparent effect 
of his religious beliefs on his public policy would cause disturbance. 
                                                
41 Peter Hofland, Leden van de raad. De Amsterdamse gemeenteraad 1814-1941 (Amsterdam, 1998) 
87-91. 
42 Stefan Couperus, De Machinerie van de Stad. Stadsbestuur als idee en praktijk, Nederland en 
Amsterdam 1900-1940 (Dissertation Groningen University: Amsterdam, 2009) chapter 10 (in press). 
43 Harm Kaal, ‘Een ondernemende burgemeester: Willem de Vlugt (1872-1945)’ in: Rolf van der 
Woude and Paul Werkman eds., Wie in de politiek gaat, is weg? (Hilversum, 2009) in press. 
44 Gert van Klinken, Actieve burgers. Nederlanders en hun politieke partijen 1870-1918 (Amsterdam, 
2003) 473, 498. 
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De Vlugt’s appointment as mayor of Amsterdam was not undisputed. First of 
all, he represented one of the smallest political parties in Amsterdam; in its heyday the 
Orthodox Protestant party ARP (Antirevolutionary Party) won only four out of the 45 
seats in the city council. Moreover, his political opponents, the social democrats and 
the old liberal elite in particular, feared that the mayor might try to impose his 
religious views on the city. Together with 5.1 percent of the Amsterdam population, 
De Vlugt was a member of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, a rather small 
and orthodox denomination. According to a liberal newspaper, in Amsterdam, more 
than in any other city in the Netherlands, a wide gap existed between the Orthodox 
Protestant faith and the views and beliefs of the citizenry in general. During his 
mayorship De Vlugt, nonetheless, managed to gain popular support. Amsterdam 
newspapers of all denominations repeatedly praised his indefatigable dedication, 
impartial stance, humour and debating technique, hailing him as an ‘Amsterdammer’ 
in the true sense of the word. Apparently, De Vlugt had managed to find the right mix 
between his own, personal, political and religious background and the traditions and 
expectations surrounding his office. On official, public occasions De Vlugt for 
instance used the old customs and traditions surrounding his office as a way to 
transcend his religious and partisan background and become a mayor of all citizens of 
Amsterdam.45 As far as politics was concerned, De Vlugt certainly did not hesitate to 




In the 1920s big cities like Amsterdam experienced the emergence of a ‘modern’ mass 
entertainment culture. An ever-growing amount of movie theatres, the introduction of 
new and highly-debated dance styles like the Shimmy and Charleston and indecent 
revues presented new challenges and choices. Concern about the immoral character of 
certain elements of modern culture, especially concerning their influence on the 
youth, was widespread. City councils debated the admissibility of dancing in public 
bars and restaurants and of plays and revues with a particular sexual undercurrent. As 
far as the moral order was concerned, members of all political parties to some extent 
contested the influence of certain elements of modern culture on adolescents in 
particular.  Dissension, however, arose on the issue of governmental interference: to 
what extent could the government be held responsible for regulating and containing 
the excesses of modern culture? In Amsterdam, Mayor De Vlugt was evidently 
involved in these debates, because of his formal responsibility to maintain public 
order and uphold public decency.  De Vlugt advocated a strong policy of government 
censorship. The mayor did not hide the fact that he, at least partially, based his 
decisions on his Orthodox Protestant faith. De Vlugts rather strict moral policy met 
with criticism from the city council where communists, some social-democrats and 
liberals opposed the mayor’s alleged efforts to impose his faith on the citizens of 
Amsterdam.46   
 In order to properly value the debate on modern culture in Amsterdam, the 
national, political debate on moral issues needs to be explained briefly. As mentioned 
in the introduction, since the turn of the century the fear for moral decay was 
omnipresent. With a confessional coalition government in power, Dutch Parliament 
started discussions on a Public Decency Law, which was proposed by the Catholic 
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46 Ibid., 105-123. 
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Minister of Justice E.R.H. Regout in 1911. His bill radiated the widespread fears for 
moral degeneration caused by pornography, prostitution, contraception propaganda 
and homosexuality. Although liberals and social democrats criticised the law as a 
means to impose the Christian faith on the nation as a whole through strict legislation, 
many agreed on the fact that these affairs posed a threat to society.47 It seemed that 
Regout was right when he stated that Dutch moral standards were evidently 
dominated by generally endorsed Christian norms and values.48 The following years 
the national government focused on the demoralisation among the youth. In its 1919 
report the State Commission for Youth Development concluded that industrialisation, 
urbanisation and the experiences of the First World War had caused demoralisation. 
In order to stop this process, the youth needed to be disciplined not just through 
repressive measures, but in a constructive way. The latter approach was picked up by 
the pillars: during the interwar years pillarised youth organisations flourished. They 
provided for a social safety net which had to lure the youth away from the baneful 
influences of modern culture.49 This, however, was not enough according to many 
administrators and politicians who emphasised the need for tight regulations. 
One of the elements of modern culture which roused fears among politicians 
and social organisations of all denominations was dancing ‘in public’: in bars, 
restaurants and the newly-established dance halls. Traditionally dance had been a 
custom among the Amsterdam elite: asking a lady for a dance – an English waltz for 
instance – was one of the first steps on the way to a close relationship. These elitist 
balls, however, were not a public event. The Amsterdam lower class also liked to go 
to dance, especially during the annual Carnival, at least up until 1875 when the liberal 
local government decided to abolish the event because of its immoral character; 
Carnival was equated with alcohol abuse and indecent behavior.50 After the First 
World War dance emerged in a different guise: as an integral part of urban nightlife in 
which members of all classes were engaged.51 In Amsterdam, dancing in public, 
however, had been forbidden for decades, because it posed a threat to public 
decency.52 The director of the Municipal Health Board even expressed his fears for an 
increase of the number of venereal diseases if dancing in public would be allowed.53   
In the Netherlands mayors bore responsibility for dance regulations since the 
Municipal Law of 1851 had charged them with watching over shows and performance 
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(in Dutch: vertoningen) like dance, theatre and film performances.54 Where Rotterdam 
and The Hague, two other major cities in the western part of the Netherlands, 
harboured several dance halls, initially mayor De Vlugt resisted the pressure from bar 
and restaurant owners to legalise dancing in public.55 De Vlugt’s stubborn stance met 
with fierce resistance; it was held against him by liberal and some social democratic 
councilors that he was trying to force his religious and moral views on the citizens of 
Amsterdam. Caricaturists depicted De Vlugt as an old-fashioned puritan with 
Victorian morals.56 According to Orthodox Protestant principles the authorities indeed 
had to act as an ‘instrument of the Common Grace’ in their battle against the sinful 
elements of modern culture.57 De Vlugt in turn certainly referred to the fears among 
confessional groups in Amsterdam for the devastating influence of the new dance 
styles on morals and sexual behavior. In addition, however, he could also point to the 
widespread dissatisfaction with the excesses of modern culture among non-
confessional groups, like some social democrats who criticised dancing as a symptom 
of degeneration and preferred their own socialist folk dances.58 Eventually, some 
confessional councilors advised De Vlugt to allow for public dancing in order to be 
able to control and regulate it. In close consultation with the chief of police De Vlugt 
handed out dance permits to seven highly reputable places in the city centre.59 In this 
case, local government managed to at least contain an element of modern culture with 
the support of confessional political parties and with reference to complaints from 
religious as well as non-religious groups. At the same time, through the government-
controlled establishment of dance halls, the local government managed to reconcile 
modern culture and fears for moral degeneration. 
The influence of confessional views on modern urban society was also 
articulated in the local government’s efforts to maintain Sunday rest. Personally, De 
Vlugt strictly observed the Sunday when he visited an evening performance in the city 
theatre at Saturday night, De Vlugt always left before midnight.60 Legally, ‘public 
attractions’, like dance, were only allowed when all religious services were finished. 
In practice, the Sunday Law, which dated back to 1815, was a dead letter. In the 
1920s the liberal mayor of The Hague J.A.N. Patijn urged the national government to 
adjust the existing regulations to ‘the spirit of the age’ which, according to Patijn, 
called for a more flexible approach.61 In Amsterdam, however, the ‘antiquated’ 
Sunday Law was well observed; Amsterdam dance regulations forbade dancing on 
Sunday, which – again – caused annoyance among bar and restaurant owners. At first, 
De Vlugt refused to yield to the protests, arguing that a ‘large part’ of the Amsterdam 
citizenry wanted the Sunday to be observed, not only confessionals, but also social 
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democrats for whom a day of rest was an element of social policy. As mayor of all 
citizens of Amsterdam, De Vlugt said to feel obliged to make a stand for their 
opinion. Moreover, according to De Vlugt the people who urged for the abolishment 
of Sunday regulations were primarily motivated by financial gain. At last, De Vlugt 
had to cave in when a majority of the city council urged him to relax dance 
regulations and allow for dancing on Sunday afternoon.62 
The ‘defeats’ De Vlugt suffered might be interpreted as a defeat for the 
confessional pillars’ Christian moral framework. In fact, the discussions on modern 
culture in Amsterdam catalyzed a broader political and public debate about the impact 
of modern culture. When the Amsterdam city council discussed the dance ban, the 
mayor of The Hague for example decided to tighten up dance regulations. Moreover, 
the – predominantly confessional – national government stepped forward and 
established national regulations for specific elements of modern culture. In 1928 a 
national movie censorship board was created. The first chairman was a social 
democrat. The following year a national commission started an investigation into the 
‘dance question’. One of the members of the commission, which included members of 
all pillars, was the liberal-oriented Amsterdam chief of police H.J. Versteeg. In its 
final report the commission stated that dancing was a symptom of moral degeneration 
which needed to be regulated by the government in order to prevent decay.63 In 1933 
the national government indeed issued national dance regulations.64 In Amsterdam 
liberals and social democrats together indeed had the political power to enforce a 
more ‘relaxed’ policy in regard to specific elements of modern culture, yet the debates 
about modern culture both in Amsterdam and on the national level were dominated by 




During the interwar years, religion still made itself felt in Amsterdam political and 
public life. During the nineteenth century a moderate, liberal-protestantism had 
formed the backbone of Dutch society. With the rise of pillarisation the unity of the 
Protestant Nation, which in fact had rather been the unity of the liberal elite, broke up 
into four parts. Pillarisation cleared the way for religious diversity and therefore 
contributed to an intensified religious life as the discussion of religious activities in 
Amsterdam has shown. Simultaneously, pillarisation implied the creation and 
organisation of secular groups, like the social democratic labour movement who 
identified itself as non-religious. Nonetheless, despite significant differences of 
opinion regarding religious dogmas and their formal implementation in politics and 
administration – as manifested for instance in the debate about modern culture – 
members of all four pillars and Dutch citizens in general observed Christian norms 
and values. The breaking up of the Protestant Nation therefore did not imply a gradual 
process of secularisation. On the contrary, as the debate about mass entertainment has 
shown, religious and secular groups shared fears for the impact of modernisation on 
the Christian-inspired norms and values of Dutch society. In Amsterdam, De Vlugts 
rather strict moral policy met with criticism from the city council where liberals and 
left-wing political parties opposed the mayor’s alleged efforts to impose his faith on 
the citizens of Amsterdam. De Vlugt, however, catered to the fears among many 
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citizens, confessional and non-confessional, about the effect of modern culture on 
public morals. By the early 1930s, policy on moral issues would be implemented at 
the national level by the confessional coalition government, as nationwide regulations 
concerning movie censorship and dancing were decreed. At the same time, ‘modern’ 
norms and values were evaluated, discussed and in some cases assimilated. Some 
religious (youth) organisations even adopted sports, music, dance and other forms of 
(modern) entertainment in order to be able to control and monitor potentially risky 
behaviour.65 The government, in turn, both on the local and the national level aimed to 
regulate specific elements of modern culture in order to prevent moral degeneration. 
Christian norms and values were at the basis of these regulations and also dominated 
the public and political debates about modern culture. 
Moreover, religion did not simply disappear under the pressure of 
modernisation, but took a different shape in form and content. Modernisation in fact 
contributed to countering of the supposed threat of secularisation. A modern 
phenomenon like mass political movements contributed to the integration of 
Orthodox-Protestants and Catholics into larger (imagined) communities. In addition, 
many of the (new) religious movements used elements of the new mass culture like 
film, radio, cars with loud speakers, well-illustrated brochures, professional 
propaganda committees and mass meetings to inform, supervise and discipline the 
religious masses.66 Finally, the public religious revival, as manifested for instance in 
the popularity of Catholic processions, can be interpreted as a ‘modern’ phenomenon 
in itself. The emergence and growing presence of public religious activities coincided 
with developments on the sociopolitical level: the interwar years were the heyday of 
open air mass meeting of political parties, parades and torch light processions. The 
urban arena was filled with highly symbolic and spiritual events which appealed to 
and stirred the imagination of the ‘modern urban citizen’. 
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